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Greater transparency in central bank operations is the most dramatic change in the conduct of monetary
policy in recent years.  In this paper we present new information on its extent and effects.  We show
that the trend is general: a large number of central banks have moved in the direction of greater transparency
since the late 1990s.  We then analyze the determinants and effects of central bank transparency in
an integrated empirical framework.  Transparency is greater in countries with more stable and developed
political systems and deeper and more developed financial markets.  Our preliminary analysis suggests















Central Bank Transparency: Where, Why, and with What Effects?
1 




  Transparency is the most dramatic difference between central banking today and 
central banking in earlier historical periods.
2  In recent years a number of central banks 
have moved in the direction of greater transparency about their objectives, procedures, 
rationales, models, and data.  The question is whether the trend is widespread and 
whether it is likely to be transitory or enduring.  Below we show that this movement in 
the direction of greater policy transparency is remarkably general.  The answer to the 
question of whether it is likely to prove durable or to be a passing phase is likely to turn 
on the consequences.  Our analysis suggests broadly favorable impacts on inflation and 
output variability.  If institutional arrangements that produce favorable results retain 
public support, then this suggests that the trend toward greater monetary policy 
transparency is here to stay. 
  While there have been a few previous studies along these lines, relatively little is  
known about actual trends in transparency, their correlates, and their implications.  
Theory has provided useful insights, as we shall see below, but its implications are less 
than general.  Our goal in this study is therefore to contribute new evidence.   
We construct an index of central bank transparency, distinguishing its 
components and dimensions, for a larger range of countries and years than in previous 
                                                 
1 State Planning Organization, Ankara, and University of California, Berkeley, respectively.  An earlier 
version was presented to the conference on central banking hosted by the Cournot Center, Paris, 30 
November-1 December 2006.  We thank Petra Geraats, Pierre Siklos and conference participants for 
helpful comments. 
2 Here we use transparency to mean information disclosure.  This minimal definition leaves unspecified 
whether or not the information set has more than one dimension and if so which dimension is relevant.  For 
more on this, see below.   2
studies.  Both the time dimension and the international dimension shed light on recent 
trends in transparency.  They allow us to ask questions like: in what countries have 
central banks been growing more transparent, and why?  Next we analyze the impact of 
transparency on inflation persistence, inflation variability and output variability.  An 
advantage of considering both the determinants of transparency and the effects is that we 
can use our analysis of the determinants to identify instrumental variables that address the 
concern that an observed correlation between outcomes and transparency reflects the 
impact of the former on the latter, rather than the other way around. 
 
2.  Reflections on the development of central bank transparency 
Central banks originated as closely held, privately owned suppliers of credit to the 
government.  Because they competed with other financial institutions, they tended to be 
less than forthcoming about their pricing and portfolio decisions.  Because they had a 
privileged relationship with the state – often with the head of state himself – the treated 
information as confidential, as properly known only to the bank and its client.  That they 
were less than transparent about their decision making is understandable given these 
circumstances. 
As part of this bargain, central banks gradually acquired their modern competency 
of regulating supplies of money and credit.  Typically they acquired it in the era of 
commodity money.  The obligation of converting their liabilities into specie at a fixed 
rate of exchange ensured an important element of transparency in their operations.  
Observers knew something about the institution’s objective function: the central bank 
assigned a high weight to the maintenance of convertibility.  They knew something about   3
the model that the central bank used, typically some variant of the price-specie flow 
model.  They were knowledgeable of the instruments used to pursue its objectives, 
typically the rate at which it discounted other obligations to regulate currency 
fluctuations, together with ancillary measures to render that discount rate effective.
3  
They observed the success with which the central bank regulated the price of specie.  
Reflecting the public or semi-public nature of this commitment, central banks published 
information on changes in gold reserves that were used by market participants to forecast 
future policies.
4  In modern studies one aspect of transparency is whether a central bank 
provides an explicit policy rule or strategy that describes its monetary policy framework; 
an exchange rate target is one such rule.  So it was in this earlier period.  The existence of 
this modicum of transparency was what made it socially acceptable to assign 
consequential public-policy functions to entities that often had private shareholders, 
mixed motives, and a good deal of bureaucratic autonomy. 
  The persistence of currency pegs through much of the 20
th century and the 
tendency to regard as aberrant and exceptional periods when those pegs were in abeyance 
is one way of understanding why there was not more intense pressure for central banks to 
reveal more information about their operations.  It was easy enough to judge, on the basis 
of events in foreign exchange markets, whether the central bank was true to its mandate.  
This perspective suggests that it is no coincidence that the tendency in the last ten years 
for central banks to become more transparent in other aspects of their operations 
                                                 
3 Meaning that changes had an immediate impact on market conditions.  
4 And, increasingly, on other portfolio aggregates that were deemed relevant to the prospective future 
maintenance of convertibility.   4
coincided with a shift toward more flexible exchange rates.
5  In a growing number of 
countries, the single thing that had done the most to lend transparency to monetary policy 
disappeared.  The result was pressure to increase other aspects of transparency, if for no 
other reason than to enhance society’s ability to hold central banks accountable to their 
ultimate stakeholders.     
  To be sure, this shift toward greater exchange rate flexibility was not exogenous.  
It did not occur in isolation from other events in economy and society.  As one of us has 
argued elsewhere, it is best understood in terms of two other late-20
th century trends: 
financial liberalization and political liberalization.
6  The deregulation of financial markets 
and the removal of controls on international financial flows made it impossible for central 
banks and governments to use one instrument to hit two targets – to peg the exchange rate 
while at the same time using monetary policy to pursue other goals.  Meanwhile, 
democratization made it more difficult to privilege the exchange rate – to credibly 
commit to pegging the exchange rate without regard to the implications for other socially 
relevant economic variables.  When unemployment rose to high levels, for example, 
political pressure for the central bank to do something about it became irresistible.  In an 
environment of deregulated financial markets and capital flows, the exchange rate peg 
was increasingly a casualty.  This was a first channel through which there was impetus to 
develop further other aspects of central bank transparency. 
                                                 
5 Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2006) show that the share of soft pegs in all exchange rate regimes has 
fallen from about 70 per cent in 1990 to 45 percent in 2004.  Soft peggers move to hard pegs (including 
monetary union in the case of European countries) and floats in a ratio of 3 to 4.  Note that, since the euro 
floats against other currencies, one would want to group the members of the euro area together with the 
floating rate countries for purposes of this argument. 
6 See Eichengreen (1996).   5
  There were also other channels linking democratization and financial 
liberalization to central bank transparency.  Democratization directly increased demands 
for public accountability.  Democratic governments are intrinsically more open about 
their affairs as a way of achieving accountability to their constituents; in this sense central 
bank transparency (the central bank being an agency of the government) is only a specific 
instance of the general point.  And transparency is one way in which such public 
accountability can be brought about.  It is surely not coincidental that the rise in central 
bank transparency in Latin America, in Eastern Europe and in Asian countries from 
Korea to the Philippines coincided with the third wave of democratization. 
Democratization also strengthened the argument for central bank independence, a 
trend that is closely allied to increased transparency.  In democratic societies, political 
pressures are intense (in a sense, this is the very definition of democracy), and there are a 
variety of arguments for why central banks, when deciding on their tactics, should be 
sheltered from those pressures via independence.
7  With the grant of independence come 
demands for adequate accountability; central banks are asked to provide more 
information about their operations to enable citizens and their representatives to evaluate 
the central bank’s actions, praise it for its achievements, and take it to task for its failures.  
In addition, independence may render the central bank more willing to volunteer 
information about its operations; when a central bank is dependent on the government, 
                                                 
7 The standard approach to this problem focuses on time inconsistency and inflationary bias when the 
central bank adopts the objective function of the median voter.  Independence is then a way of permitting 
the appointment of central bankers who are more conservative than the median voter as a way of offsetting 
the inflationary bias that results for inability to precommit.  But there are other models that also suggest a 
link from democratization to central bank independence, such as models of the political business cycle 
suggesting that a politically-dependent central bank feel pressure to inefficiently loosen in the run-up to 
elections.   6
keeping information private is one way that it can advance its own goals relative to those 
of its political masters.
8 
Finally, financial liberalization made it important that central bank actions should 
have a stable and predictable impact on market variables.  Deregulation eliminated the 
authorities’ ability to control market outcomes directly.  The growth of financial markets 
and transactions made the market response to policies all the more essential for achieving 
the central bank’s ultimate objectives.  Volatility, when it occurred, was even more 
disruptive than before.  This made it more important that the central bank communicate 
with market participants in a way that inspired confidence and avoided causing excessive 
volatility.  Insofar as communication means the regularized transmission of information, 
the implication was an increase in the extent of central bank transparency.
9           
It is against this backdrop that we ask: what exactly is the state of central bank 
transparency?  And what has been the impact on economic outcomes? 
   
3.  Theory 
  Economists are instinctually of the view that more information is better.  In the 
present context they argue that having a central bank more fully communicate its 
objectives, its assessment of the effects of policy actions, and information about 
economic conditions will enhance social welfare.  Policy being more predictable, agents 
will be better able to align their decisions with those of the central bank.  The economy 
                                                 
8 On these arguments see Geraats (2005) and below. 
9 To what extent this desire to avoid excessive volatility and avoid destabilizing financial markets, while 
advancing the central bank’s other goals, implies the desirability of greater transparency is a disputed issue, 
as we will see below.     7
will adjust more smoothly insofar as they can more accurately forecast the time paths of 
relevant variables.   
  By the same token, the theory of the second best suggests that removing one 
distortion may not always lead to a more efficient allocation when other distortions are 
present.  Adding distortions, theorists have thus provided counterexamples where greater 
transparency may not lead to a welfare improvement. 
  Transparency has typically been modeled in a Barro-Gordon (1983) setup where 
there is uncertainty about the central bank’s preferences and the central bank may wish to 
stimulate output to levels above the natural rate.  As in Backus and Driffill (1985), the 
public will use outcomes or actions to infer the central bank’s preferences.  Because 
private-sector decisions are taken before disturbances are known, there may be a role for 
stabilizing policy.  But if the central bank prefers a level of output above the natural rate, 
stabilizing policy may have an inflationary bias.  Thus, such models include a number of 
distortions that make it possible to obtain different results about whether transparency is 
welfare improving or preferred by the central bank. 
  Faust and Svensson (2001) consider a model in which the public attempts to infer 
the central bank’s type from information on policy outcomes.  Inference is imperfect 
because of unanticipated monetary control errors that the public observes incompletely.  
Greater transparency the control error enables agents to infer the central bank’s 
preferences more accurately.  In turn this gives the monetary authority an incentive to 
build a reputation for valuing price stability.  The private sector becomes more sensitive 
to unanticipated policy responses and actions, attenuating the incentive for the central 
bank to engage in them.  The result is thus greater sensitivity of inflation expectations to   8
policy actions, less benefit to the central bank of inflating, and less inflationary bias.  In 
this way increased transparency about control errors improves social welfare.   
Greater transparency about the central bank’s objectives has similar effects – the 
central bank is led to moderate its inflationary bias – but in certain cases extreme 
transparency about objectives may be welfare reducing.  Greater transparency about 
objectives not only eliminates uncertainty about inflation and output but also removes the 
central bank’s incentive to curtail inflation in order to signal its type.  Hence neither the 
central bank nor society may prefer goal transparency. 
Making minor modifications of the Faust-Svensson framework, Jensen (2002) 
shows that increases in transparency about outcomes can be welfare reducing as well.  In 
Faust and Svensson, inflation expectations are formed at the start of the period and 
current policy decisions affect output only in the future; this means that there are no costs 
in terms of foregoing stabilization policy.  In Jensen’s model, in contrast, not every firm 
is permitted to change its prices at the beginning of every period, so there are 
implications for output in the current period.  Inflation expectations and hence current 
inflation become more sensitive to policy when the public is able to infer the central 
bank’s preferences and hence to predict its future behavior.  The central bank is led to 
pay more attention to inflation.  Transparency may be welfare increasing if the central 
bank lacks credibility and market expectations and reactions provide discipline 
preventing excessive inflation.  But it may be welfare reducing if shocks to output are 
large and stabilization policy is hamstrung.  In general there will be an optimal degree of 
transparency that trades off these two considerations.   9
  Geraats (2002a) models the private-sector response to policy actions themselves, 
not to the outcomes from which policy actions are inferred.  The public is imperfectly 
informed about shocks to the economy and uses the interest rate to infer the central 
bank’s target.  Contrary to Jensen, greater transparency may not hamstring stabilization 
policy.  To the contrary, an opaque central bank may have to limit the variability of its 
interest rate in order to signal its type.  It is forced to smooth the interest rate in order to 
avoid exciting inflation expectations.  Hence it may be less able to counter output shocks. 
In addition, when the degree of transparency is endogenous, signaling and self-
selection can arise.  The public will expect opaque central banks to be more inflationary 
and it will form higher inflation expectations.  Geraats shows that this may be sufficiently 
costly that even weak central banks prefer transparency, contrary to the implications of 
other models.  
Assuming that inflation expectations are set by the private sector acting 
strategically instead of by agents passively forming rational expectations further weakens 
the presumption that more transparency about objectives enhances welfare.  Sorensen 
(1991) considers the case where wages are set by a risk-averse labor union whose 
demands depend on inflation expectations.  Again, uncertainty about the central bank’s 
objective raises the variance of inflation and output.  But since the union is risk averse, it 
may demand wages lower than those corresponding to its unbiased forecast of inflation in 
order to limit volatility.  This second effect will work to reduce the level of inflation and 
increase the level of output.
10  But this effect disappears if the central bank makes its 
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level but also the variance of inflation may turn out to be lower as a consequence of greater uncertainty 
about the central bank’s objectives.   10
objectives public information, so that the risk aversion of the wage-setting union no 
longer matters. 
  Morris and Shin (2002) address a related coordination problem, where individual 
welfare depends not just on the state of the world but on the actions of other individuals.  
Starting from a position where both private and public information are imperfect, they 
show that greater precision of public information can lead individuals to attach 
inadequate weight to private information.  In the absence of coordination motives, the 
precision attached to the public and private signals will be commensurate with their 
relative precision.  When coordination motives are present, however, agents attach 
greater weight to the public signal, since they know this to be common information.  But 
since the public signal is noisy, this weight on the public signal may be suboptimal from 
a social-welfare point of view; agents may be led to coordinate on an inefficient 
equilibrium.  This adverse outcome is more likely the more precise is private information.  
Svensson (2006) argues that this result obtains only under extreme parameter values – 
when the public signal is very noisy relative to its private counterpart.    
   This brief survey suffices to make the point.
11  General conclusions based on 
theory remain elusive.  Results are sensitive to what one assumes about the structure of 
the economy (the determinants of supply and demand, the channels through which 
monetary policy affects output and inflation), the stochastic structure (what relationships 
are subject to disturbances), the information environment (what the central bank knows 
that the private sector does not and the relative and absolute precision of their signals), 
the timing of actions and decisions, and the institutional setting (whether the central bank 
                                                 
11 More comprehensive surveys of the theoretical literature include Geraats (2002b) and Carpenter (2004).   11
has the political independence to take decisions on the basis of an objective function that 
differs from that of the private sector or the government).   
 
4.  Previous empirics  
  Empirical studies of central bank transparency are still in their infancy.  Most take 
the form of detailed studies of individual central banks, describe disclosure practices in 
detail, and/or attempt to identify an effect of changes in disclosure practices on specific 
financial and economic variables using time-series data.
12  They are valuable for 
demonstrating the feasibility of bringing the concept of transparency to the data.  Their 
limitations are the difficulty of knowing how far to generalize the findings of individual 
cases and the difficulty of identifying the impact of increased transparency on the basis of 
a time series, especially when there may be only one significant change in disclosure 
practices in the sample period and other things were going on at the same time. 
More recently, a number of studies have attempted to compare the transparency of 
different central banks. Typically they measure transparency either for a very limited 
number of central banks or a single point in time.  Examples include Eijffinger and 
Geraats (2006), who distinguish political transparency (that is, openness about policy 
objectives), economic transparency (openness about data, models and forecasts), 
procedural transparency (openness about the way decisions are taken, achieved mainly 
                                                 
12 Examples of studies that attempt to estimate the impact of greater disclosure include Muller and Zelmer 
(1999) for Canada, Chadha and Noland (2001) for the UK, Haldane and Read (2000) for the UK and US, 
and Kuttner and Posen (2000) for the US, Germany and Japan.  There is a related literature examining the 
association of having an inflation-targeting regime with various measures of economic performance.  This 
is a good point at which to observe that transparency is generally regarded as integral to the effective 
implementation of inflation targeting, although countries conventionally characterized as inflation targeters 
tend to differ in exactly how transparent they are, and inflation targeting as conventionally defined entails 
more than simply the disclosure of information.  Thus, while the concepts overlap, they are distinct.  It 
follows that empirical indices of whether or not a central bank targets inflation and how transparent it is, 
while correlated, measure different things.   12
through the release of minutes and votes), policy transparency (openness about the policy 
implications, achieved through prompt announcement and explanation of decisions), and 
operational transparency (openness about the implementation of those decisions, in other 
words about control errors and macroeconomic disturbances affecting their magnitude), 
and three subcategories within each of these five dimensions.  Their overall index is the 
sum (equally weighted average) of the subindices for these five dimensions.  The strength 
of this approach is its comprehensive, multidimensional definition of transparency; its 
limitation is that it is constructed for just nine central banks (the Reserve Bank of 
Australia, Bank of Canada, ECB, Bank of Japan, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Swedish 
Riksbank, Swiss National Bank, Bank of England, and Federal Reserve).
13  The results 
indicate sharp differences between more and less transparent central banks as of this date 
(with the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of England and the Swedish Riksbank 
at the top in terms of transparency, and the Reserve Bank of Australia, Bank of Japan and 
the Swiss National Bank at the bottom). 
  A related study is Bini-Smaghi and Gros (2001), who like Eijffinger-Geraats 
consider 15 aspects of central bank transparency.
14  They implement their index for four 
countries: the Fed, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, and the ECB. De Haan, 
Amtembrink and Waller (2004) develop a similar index for six countries.
15  Siklos (2002) 
expands coverage to 20 central banks, all from advanced industrial countries.  There is 
again considerable overlap with the contemporaneous work of Eiffjinger-Geraats and 
                                                 
13 The index covers the period 1998-2002. 
14 Although they group these into three broad categories rather than five. 
15 In an unpublished companion paper (De Haan and Amtembrink 2002) two of the authors apply a similar 
methodology to 15 countries.   13
Bini-Smaghi-Gros.
16  Siklos’ ranking has the Bank of England, the Fed and the Riksbank 
as one, two and three, and the Austrian National Bank, the Bank of France and the 
National Bank of Belgium bringing up the rear.   
  The most comprehensive such study is Fry et al. (2000).  The strength of their 
analysis is its wide country coverage, based on a survey of 94 central banks.  Its 
limitation is a more restrictive definition of transparency.  Their measure is an equally-
weighted average of three elements: whether the central bank provides prompt public 
explanations of its policy decisions, the frequency and form of forward-looking analysis 
provided to the public, and the frequency of bulletins, speeches and research papers.  One 
can question the unbiasedness of an index constructed on the basis of a survey of central 
banks, especially when that survey is administered by a multilateral with a known interest 
in transparency.  And that their data are for 1998 is less than ideal, given the changes in 
transparency practices in subsequent years. 
  A number of authors have examined the relationship of these measures to 
economic and financial variables.  Demertzis and Hughes Hallett (2003) employ the 
Eijffinger-Geraats index for 2001 to examine the relationship between central bank 
transparency and the level and variability of inflation and the output gap in the period 
1990-2001.  The results suggest a negative relationship between inflation variability and 
central bank transparency, but not between the level of inflation and transparency.  The 
former relationship appears to be driven by the subindices for economic and operational 
transparency (whether the central bank discloses information about data, its models, its 
                                                 
16 Siklos takes an unweighted average of 11 subindices, whereas Eiffjinger and Geraats take an unweighted 
average of five.  But Eiffjinger and Geraats distinguish three equally-weighted aspects of each of their five 
dimensions, making for a total of 15 questions.  Siklos distinguishes subtopics in the case of three of his 11 
questions.   14
forecasts, and the disturbances to which monetary policy is subject).  There is no evident 
relationship between transparency and average output deviations but a strong positive 
relationship between transparency and the variability of output.  The latter seems to be 
driven by the subindex for operational transparency.  The positive association of 
transparency with output variability is consistent with theoretical studies suggesting that 
more transparency may make for more volatile inflation expectations, to which a central 
bank may respond by using its monetary instruments less actively, limiting its 
effectiveness as an instrument of stabilization policy.
17  However, the fact that the 
transparency data are for the end of the period over which economic performance is 
analyzed suggests that what these correlations may be picking up are the economic 
determinants of transparency rather than its consequences.
18 
  Chortareas et al. (2001) and Cecchetti and Krause (2001) utilize the Fry et al. 
index.  Chortareas et al. focus on whether the central bank publishes a forward-looking 
analysis of economic prospects: they find that this aspect of disclosure reduces average 
inflation, even in the presence of controls.
19  Cecchetti and Krause examine the impact of 
transparency on inflation and output variability and find a weak negative association with 
a weighted average of the two variability measures.   
  In sum, existing empirical studies do not all reach consistent conclusions.  Many 
are based on very limited country samples or utilize evidence for a single point in time.  
Cross sections, unlike panels, do not permit the inclusion of country fixed effects, giving 
                                                 
17 That said, it is clear that one should not put too much weight on empirical results when there are only 
nine observations and nothing is done to control for other country characteristics and the possibility of 
reverse causality. 
18 In Eijffinger and Geraats (2004) the authors show that there is no relationship between their index for 
nine central banks and subsequent economic performance. 
19 Not surprisingly, it does not hold for countries with pegged exchange rates, for which inflation is given 
by foreign conditions.   15
grounds for worrying that an observed correlation between transparency and economic 
outcomes may be picking up the effects of other country characteristics that are difficult 
to capture.  Moreover, central banks that are transparent about their policies are not likely 
to be selected randomly from the larger population.  The theoretical literature suggests 
that there are systematic reasons, having to do with a country’s history, its economic 
structure, and even the behavior of the economic and financial variables of interest, why 
its central bank may prefer more or less transparency.  A convincing empirical analysis 
will have to take these considerations into account. 
   
5.  Data 
  Our indices of central bank transparency replicate and extend those of Eijffinger 
and Geraats.  Their approach has the advantage of acknowledging that the phenomenon 
has multiple dimensions.
20  The result is 15 subindices, described in detail in the 
appendix, designed to capture five broad aspects of transparency: political, economic, 
procedural, policy and operational.  The overall index thus runs from 0 to 15.  Adopting 
the same criteria used by these previous investigators facilitates comparison across 
studies and frees us of suspicions that we have constructed our measures so as to 
maximize or minimize the impact of transparency. 
We draw our data from information on central banks’ websites and in their 
statutes, annual reports, and other published documents, rather than sending a survey 
instrument to the central banks themselves and relying on the subjectivity of responding 
staff.  But we follow Fry et al. by gathering this information for as large a number of 
central banks as possible.  In addition we gather the same information for every year from 
                                                 
20 Rather than focusing on a small handful of dimensions, as in Fry et al.   16
1998 through 2005.  Where there was a change in some aspect of transparency over the 
course of a calendar year, we took the value that prevailed for the largest share of the 
year.
21   
We were able to assemble this information for 100 central banks.  This is the 
majority of central banks in the world.
22  Most of the omissions are central banks of 
micro-states: our sample includes the central banks of all large, systemically significant 
countries.
23     
Table 1 shows the results by country and region.  The most transparent central 
banks in 2005, according to our coding, were, in descending order, the Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand, the Swedish Riksbank, the Bank of England, the Czech National Bank, the 
Bank of Canada, the ECB, and the Central Bank of the Philippines.  We see here a 
number of countries that have received high marks for transparency in previous studies 
(New Zealand, Sweden, the UK, Canada) but also others (the Czech Republic, the 
Philippines), which is a reminder of the advantages of broad country coverage and of the 
fact that a number of countries with relatively opaque central banking practices have been 
moving in the direction of greater transparency.  The seven least transparent central banks 
were those of Aruba, Bermuda, Ethiopia, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.  
                                                 
21 Starting in 1998 facilitates comparisons of our measure with that of Fry et al.  Adding this time 
dimension was particularly challenging, since many central bank websites describe current practice but not 
that of prior years.  For this we had to rely mainly on published documents.  We were able to access a 
relatively complete run of these on the basis of holdings in the University of California and Joint IMF-
World Bank libraries. We are grateful to the staff of the Joint Bank-Fund library for granting us access to 
their collection. 
22 Recall that there are more countries than there are central banks, given the existence of monetary unions. 
23 But there are a few additional omissions, reflecting cases where we were not able to glean information 
from a central bank’s website or its publications. And in cases where the central bank provides this 
information only in the language of its own country and we could not translate it.  Among the omissions 
from our sample are Bolivia, Ecuador, Chad, Iran, and Afghanistan. We are aware that this creates a form 
of sampling bias: we tend to oversample more transparent central banks.  There exist econometric 
corrections for this bias (involving strong assumptions), although we have not implemented these yet.  Our 
defense is that the number of consequential omissions is relatively slight.   17
Table 2 shows our coding of the 15 individual components for these 14 countries as of 
2005. 
More generally, we can compare different dimensions of central bank 
transparency.  In 2005, 63 central banks received scores of 2 or more for political 
transparency (inter alia, providing a quantitative definition of their objectives to the 
public).
24  Economic transparency (disclosing data, the policy model and forecasts) is 
less; only 5 central banks receive the highest possible rating. The picture is similar for 
procedural transparency (the release of minutes and votes), where only three central 
banks receive the highest possible score.
25  And again for policy transparency (prompt 
announcement and comprehensive explanation of policy decisions), where only the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Swedish Riksbank and the Fed receive a score of 2.5.  
No central bank receives a perfect score of 3 for operational transparency (release of 
information about disturbances, control errors, etc.)  
Taking unweighted averages of the countries making up a region (as in Table 1), 
we see the highest level of transparency in Australia-New Zealand, followed by Western 
Europe, Northern Europe, South East Asia, Southern Africa, and North America.  That 
South East Asia and Southern Africa are scored as more transparent than North America 
is a figment of the unweighted averages.  When we instead take GDP-weighted averages, 
as in Table 3, the most transparent regions as of 2005, in descending order, are Europe 
(led by Northern Europe), Oceania, Southern Africa (dominated by South Africa) and 
North America; lower weights on its relatively transparent small economies cause South 
East Asia to drop down. Either way, the lowest levels of transparency, starting from the 
                                                 
24 Up from 47 in 1998.  
25 Up from 2 in 1998, where the addition is Sweden.   18
bottom, are those of Northern Africa, Eastern Africa, Western Africa, and Melanesia – no 
surprises there.  
 We can compare our index (denoted DE) for 1998 with that of Fry et al. for the 
same year for the 67 countries that are common to the two samples.  The two measures 
have a correlation coefficient of 0.57.  For ease of comparison, in Figure 1 both indices 
are scaled to run from zero to 100.
26  The case where our estimate of transparency 
exceeds that of Fry et al. by the most is Uruguay, while that for which the opposite is true 
is Indonesia.
27  We do not have a ready explanation for the coding differences for these 
particular observations. 
Turning to trends over time, the average transparency score in our sample rises 
from 3.4 in 1998 and 5.2 in 2005.  Strikingly, none of our 100 countries moved in the 
direction of less transparency over this period.  Figure 2 compares our measure of 
transparency in 1998 and 2005 (with 2005 on the vertical axis).  There are only 11 
countries on the diagonal, indicating no increase in transparency, while the remaining 89 
cases are all above and to its left. 
Figure 3 shows transparency by level of economic development (again, using 
weighted averages).  Consistent with the preceding discussion, central banks in the 
advanced countries are more transparent than central banks in emerging markets (defined 
as middle-income countries with significant links to international financial markets), 
which in turn are more transparent than central banks in developing countries.  Consistent 
with Figure 2 above, there have been increases in central bank transparency in all three 
                                                 
26 It is not surprising that central bank staff, when asked their subjective opinion of the transparency of their 
own institution, rank it higher than we rate it on the basis of published information. 
27 The other two cases where our measure of transparency is most dramatically above that of Fry et al. are 
Mauritius and Bahrain.   19
country groups.  Perhaps most strikingly, the increase among emerging markets is, on 
average, as large in absolute value as the increase among advanced countries; the 
corresponding increase among developing countries is smaller.   Much of the increase in 
emerging markets is centered in the period following the Asian crisis and again in the 
early parts of the current decade. 
 
6.  Determinants 
  We now use regression analysis to further characterize differences in central bank 
transparency.  Our goals here are to work toward an explanation for these variations and 
also to identify instruments for our analysis of the consequences of transparency.   
We start with the 1998-2004 cross section, with all variables averaged over the 
period.
28  We regress transparency on a vector of economic determinants: per capita 
income, inflation history (defined as the lagged log first difference of the consumer price 
index), the de facto exchange rate regime (the Reinhart-Rogoff 2003 version as updated 
by Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia 2006), and financial depth (defined as the ratio of M2 to 
GDP).  In addition we include a range of potential political determinants: rule of law, 
political stability, voice and accountability, and government efficiency (all taken from 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2005).  Since the political variables are highly 
correlated, we include them one at a time. 
  The results (Table 4) suggest, not surprisingly, that per capita GDP, which proxies 
for the general level of economic and institutional development, is the most robust 
                                                 
28 2004 being the most recent year for which all the ancillary variables are available.  The results for 
individual years show the same patterns but lower levels of significance.  This makes sense, insofar as 
changes in central-bank practice develop gradually and are unlikely to respond to changes in economic or 
political conditions in a single year; looking at longer-period averages thus increases the signal-to-noise 
ratio.   20
correlate of overall transparency.  This could have been predicted from Figure 3.  In 
addition, countries with more flexible exchange rates (where a larger value of the index 
denotes greater flexibility) tend to be more transparent in the conduct of monetary policy, 
as anticipated in Section 2 – the absence of an exchange rate peg eliminating one 
traditional device for monitoring central bank actions.
29  A number of the political 
variables are significant, although at levels that vary with the proxy used.
30  Greater 
transparency characterizes central bank operations in countries that rank higher in terms 
of rule of law, that have more stable political systems, that have higher ratings in terms of 
voice and accountability, and that are more favorably regarded in terms of government 
efficiency.
31  The correlation of these political variables with central bank transparency 
will be useful when we consider the impact of transparency on economic and financial 
variables below.
32  As a form of sensitivity analysis Table 5 adds openness and interacts 
it with the exchange rate regime: the results suggest that greater openness is associated 
with greater transparency if a country has a relatively flexible exchange rate but with less 
                                                 
29 Readers may be concerned that the exchange rate regime is endogenous – that countries with experience 
with monetary policy transparency may be better able to operate regimes of grater flexibility.  Fortunately, 
dropping the exchange-rate regime variable left the other results unchanged. 
30 The other variables do not approach statistical significance at conventional confidence levels.  For what 
they are worth, the point estimates suggest that central banks of countries with a history of inflation tend to 
be more transparent, presumably as part of a credibility-building strategy.  This is not something that would 
have been anticipated from the contrast between transparency in advanced and developing countries.  
Central banks in more open economies appear to be less transparent; again, this is not something that we 
would have anticipated from high-profile cases like New Zealand or Sweden.  We will have more to say 
about these correlations below. 
31 When we include multiple political variables (as we do in additional regressions available on request), 
significance levels vary, but it is voice and accountability and government efficiency that are most often 
significant at standard confidence levels. 
32 That is, while it is not hard to come up with an argument for why the transparency of monetary policy 
should affect inflation, financial markets, or the development of trade, it is harder to concoct a story for 
why it should have a first-order effect on, say, rule of law, which depends on the larger political and social 
setting and is the product of a country’s history.  It can thus be argued that such political variables satisfy 
the two criteria for a valid instrument: exogeneity and correlation with the explanatory variable of interest.   21
transparency if the country has a relatively rigid currency; again this accords with 
intuition and casual observation. 
  We can also use this specification to consider factors influencing trends in 
transparency.  In Tables 6 and 7 we pool the annual observations and estimate fixed-
effects models (including separate intercepts for each country).
33  The estimates are now 
driven by the time series variation in the data; they thus tell us something about why 
central bank practice is evolving in the direction of greater transparency.  The exchange 
rate regime and per capita income continue to enter as before.  However, greater political 
and social stability now appears to have a negative impact on monetary-policy 
transparency.
34  The result is not intuitive because, as Figure 4 shows, there is a positive 
cross-section correlation between the two variables.  Recall, however, that fixed-effects 
regressions eliminate the cross section variation.  We suspect that what we are seeing is 
that advanced countries with highly-transparent central banks and stable political systems 
cannot move much further in those directions (they contribute relatively little to the 
variation in the data), while countries that are not as admirable in terms of political 
stability and rule of law (Brazil, Colombia, Thailand, Philippines) have been moving in 
the direction of greater central bank transparency precisely in order to insulate monetary 
policy from political problems.
35  
                                                 
33 The standard Hausman and Breusch-Pagan tests reject random effects and simple pooling in favor of 
fixed effects (the Hausman test statistic is reported at the foot of the tables).  See also the further discussion 
below. 
34 We find the same thing when we include different political variables, individually or in combination. 
35 We can also analyze the determinants of the components of the transparency index to gain further insight 
into exactly how practice responds to these economic and political factors.  Not surprisingly, political 
transparency is a positive function of political development and stability (whether this is measured by rule 
of law, political turnover, voice and accountability or government efficiency).  The cross-section 
regressions for 2004 also suggest, more surprisingly, that political transparency appears to decline with 
financial depth.  However, regressions for other years and for the period averages indicate that this result is 
not robust.  Economic transparency (the public disclosure of data, the policy model and forecasts) is again   22
Overall, the analysis confirms that transparency is greater in countries with more 
stable and developed political systems and deeper and more developed financial markets.  
The one surprise is the negative association between some components of transparency 
and economic openness, although the robustness of this association may be questioned. 
 
7.  Effects 
  We now explore the effects of monetary policy transparency.  Some previous 
studies (viz. Mishkin, 2004) suggest that greater transparency should be associated with a 
reduction in uncertainty about future policy actions and thus with a reduction in inflation 
volatility.  Others (viz. Ball and Sheridan, 2005) have found evidence of a reduction in 
the average rate of inflation but not in the level or volatility of growth.  Here we consider 
the impact on output variability, inflation variability, and inflation persistence.  In 
contrast to previous studies we acknowledge the endogeneity of monetary policy 
transparency by using the political variables utilized to explain the degree of transparency 
in Section 5 as instruments for transparency in this section’s (second-stage) regressions.  
Specifically, in the results reported below we use rule of law as an instrument for central 
bank transparency.
36 
                                                                                                                                                 
positively related to political development and stability.  It is positively related to financial development, as 
one would expect.  More surprisingly, it appears to be less in more open economies, other things equal.  
Procedural transparency (the release of minutes and votes) is related, again positively, only to political 
development and stability.  In contrast, policy transparency (prompt announcement and comprehensive 
explanation of policy decisions) is greater in countries with more stable and open political systems but also 
less in more open economies, or so the regressions on the period averages suggest.  Finally, it would appear 
that operational transparency (release of information about disturbances, control errors, etc.) is again 
greater in countries with more stable political systems but also in countries with more developed financial 
markets, while it is less in more open economies.  These results are available from the authors on request. 
36 Results using alternative instrument lists are discussed below and are available from the authors on 
request.   23
  Table 8 reports the estimates for inflation variability.  Note that in each column 
we report the sum of squared residuals comparing the change in the point estimates with 
the loss of efficiency when instrumental variables are used; the change in the point 
estimates being relatively large, this supports our use of instrumental variables. 
The regressions suggest that past inflation is positively related to inflation 
variability, while financial depth is negatively related to inflation variability.  Of 
particular interest is the coefficient on transparency, which is negative and, in most cases, 
statistically significant.  This is consistent with theories suggesting that greater monetary-
policy transparency allows the public to react more quickly to policy adjustments, in turn 
discouraging the authorities from attempting to manipulate inflation in the pursuit of 
other objectives. 
  Table 9 considers inflation persistence.  Transparency enters negatively, 
consistent with the notion that greater policy transparency allows the public to adjust 
more quickly, in turn limiting the incentive for the central bank to run persistently 
inflationary policies in an effort to achieve objectives other than price stability.  
However, the coefficient in question is statistically significant at the 90 per cent level in 
only two of six specifications.  Table 10 considers an alternative formulation where the 
dependent variable is current inflation and the explanatory variables include lagged 
inflation (the coefficient on which picks up inflation persistence) and also the interaction 
of lagged inflation with the fitted value of transparency (from the first-stage regression).  
The coefficient on the interaction term, which tells us whether inflation persistence is 
greater, lesser or no different in countries where monetary policy is more transparent, is   24
negative, consistent with earlier results, and it is also significantly different from zero at 
the 90 per cent level in all three columns. 
Finally, in Table 11 we consider the determinants of output variability.  Here 
analytical work offers competing predictions: as noted above, some models suggest that 
greater policy transparency should be associated with more stability because it allows the 
public to adjust more quickly to policy actions; but others suggest that a more transparent 
monetary policy may be associated with more output volatility because it prevents the 
authorities from using policy as actively to offset output fluctuations (policy actions 
instead feeding through more quickly into inflation and hence deterring policy activism) 
or because coordination externalities cause individuals to attach excessive weight to the 
public signal.  A limitation of these results is that we have only annual data on output for 
the broad sample of countries that is our subject, forcing us to measure output variable as 
the standard deviation of the growth rate over the most recent three year period.
37  Be that 
as it may, the results are consistent with a negative impact of monetary policy 
transparency on output variability.
38 
 
8.  Conclusion 
  Greater transparency in central bank operations is the most dramatic recent 
change in the conduct of monetary policy.  We understand it as a response to other 
                                                 
37 The current calendar year and its two immediate predecessors. 
38 We also conducted a number of robustness checks.  For example, we reestimated the equations using 
fixed effects; doing so, and relying exclusively on the time series variation in the data, produces weaker 
evidence of real effects of transparency.  Rather than taking an unweighted average of our 15 dimensions of 
transparency, we constructed their first principal component and used its instrumented value as the 
transparency-related explanatory variable in Tables 8-11.  Again the results are somewhat weaker than 
before.  As noted above, we alternatively used different political variables, or combinations of political 
variables, as instruments for transparency in Tables 8-11.  Doing so did not weaken the results for output 
variability in Table 11, although some alternative combinations of instruments produced lower levels of 
significance in Tables 8-10.   25
changes in the monetary policy environment.  It is a way of ensuring the accountability of 
policy makers when the traditional mechanisms for doing so – public monitoring of 
compliance with an exchange rate commitment and direct oversight by a government 
with formal control – are in decline, reflecting the shift to flexible exchange rates and 
central bank independence.   
In this paper we have presented new information on the extent of the trend and its 
effects.  The trend is general – a large number of central banks have moved in the 
direction of greater transparency in recent years.  The question is whether it will prove 
durable or be a passing phase.  In part, the answer depends on the consequences.  Our 
preliminary analysis suggests broadly favorable if relatively weak impacts on inflation 
and output variability.  If institutional arrangements that produce favorable results retain 
public support, then this suggests that the trend toward greater monetary policy 
transparency is here to stay. 
The other way of approaching this question is to ask whether the changes in the 
larger policy environment that precipitated the move toward greater transparency in 
monetary policy might themselves be rolled back.  We see the abandonment of pegged 
exchange rates as a response to financial liberalization, and greater central bank 
independence as a way of insulating the conduct of monetary policy from short-term 
political pressures in democracies.  If financial globalization and political 
democratization are here to stay, then so too is greater transparency in the conduct of 
monetary policy.   26
Data Appendix 
 
This appendix describes the construction of the transparency index. The index is the sum 
of the scores for answers to the fifteen questions below (min = 0, max = 15). 
1. Political Transparency 
Political transparency refers to openness about policy objectives. This comprises a 
formal statement of objectives, including an explicit prioritization in case of multiple 
goals, a quantification of the primary objective(s), and explicit institutional arrangements.  
(a) Is there a formal statement of the objective(s) of monetary policy, with an explicit 
prioritization in case of multiple objectives? 
No formal objective(s) = 0. 
Multiple objectives without prioritization = 1/2. 
One primary objective, or multiple objectives with explicit priority = 1. 
(b) Is there a quantification of the primary objective(s)? 
No = 0. 
Yes = 1. 
(c) Are there explicit contacts or other similar institutional arrangements between the 
monetary authorities and the government? 
No central bank contracts or other institutional arrangements = 0. 
Central bank without explicit instrument independence or contract = 1/2. 
Central bank with explicit instrument independence or central bank contract 
although possibly subject to an explicit override procedure = 1. 
2. Economic Transparency 
Economic transparency focuses on the economic information that is used for 
monetary policy. This includes economic data, the model of the economy that the central 
bank employs to construct forecasts or evaluate the impact of its decisions, and the 
internal forecasts (model based or judgmental) that the central bank relies on. 
(a) Is the basic economic data relevant for the conduct of monetary policy publicly 
available? (The focus is on the following five variables: money supply, inflation, GDP, 
unemployment rate and capacity utilization.) 
Quarterly time series for at most two out of the five variables = 0. 
Quarterly time series for three or four out of the five variables = 1/2. 
Quarterly time series for all five variables = 1. 
(b) Does the central bank disclose the macroeconomic model(s) it uses for policy 
analysis? 
No = 0. 
Yes = 1. 
(c) Does the central bank regularly publish its own macroeconomic forecasts? 
No numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output = 0. 
Numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and/or output published at less than 
quarterly frequency = 1/2. 
Quarterly numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output for the 
medium term (one to two years ahead), specifying the assumptions about the policy 
instrument (conditional or unconditional forecasts) = 1.   27
3. Procedural Transparency 
Procedural transparency is about the way monetary policy decisions are taken. 
(a) Does the central bank provide an explicit policy rule or strategy that describes its 
monetary policy framework? 
No = 0. 
Yes = 1. 
(b) Does the central bank give a comprehensive account of policy deliberations (or 
explanations in case of a single central banker) within a reasonable amount of time? 
No or only after a substantial lag (more than eight weeks) = 0. 
Yes, comprehensive minutes (although not necessarily verbatim or attributed) or 
explanations (in case of a single central banker), including a discussion of backward and 
forward-looking arguments = 1. 
(c) Does the central bank disclose how each decision on the level of its main operating 
instrument or target was reached? 
No voting records, or only after substantial lag (more than eight weeks) = 0. 
Non-attributed voting records = 1/2. 
Individual voting records, or decision by single central banker = 1. 
4. Policy Transparency 
Policy transparency means prompt disclosure of policy decisions, together with an 
explanation of the decision, and an explicit policy inclination or indication of likely 
future policy actions. 
(a) Are decisions about adjustments to the main operating instrument or target announced 
promptly? 
No or only after the day of implementation = 0. 
Yes, on the day of implementation = 1. 
(b) Does the central bank provide an explanation when it announces policy decisions? 
No = 0. 
Yes, when policy decisions change, or only superficially = 1/2. 
Yes, always and including forwarding-looking assessments = 1. 
(c) Does the central bank disclose an explicit policy inclination after every policy 
meeting or an explicit indication of likely future policy actions (at least quarterly)? 
No = 0. 
Yes = 1. 
 
  5. Operational Transparency 
Operational transparency concerns the implementation of the central bank’s 
policy actions. It involves a discussion of control errors in achieving operating targets and 
(unanticipated) macroeconomic disturbances that affect the transmission of monetary 
policy. Furthermore, the evaluation of the macroeconomic outcomes of monetary policy 
in light of its objectives is included here as well. 
(a) Does the central bank regularly evaluate to what extent its main policy operating 
targets (if any) have been achieved? 
No or not very often (at less than annual frequency) = 0.   28
Yes but without providing explanations for significant deviations = 1/2. 
Yes, accounting for significant deviations from target (if any); or, (nearly) perfect 
control over main operating instrument/target = 1. 
(b) Does the central bank regularly provide information on (unanticipated) 
macroeconomic disturbances that affect the policy transmission process? 
No or not very often = 0. 
Yes but only through short-term forecasts or analysis of current macroeconomic 
developments (at least quarterly) = 1/2. 
Yes including a discussion of past forecast errors (at least annually) = 1. 
(c) Does the central bank regularly provide an evaluation of the policy outcome in light 
of its macroeconomic objectives? 
No or not very often (at less than annual frequency) = 0. 
Yes but superficially = 1/2. 
Yes, with an explicit account of the contribution of monetary policy in meeting 
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Table 1. Transparency, by Region         
            
   1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 2005
            
Africa   2.2 2.2 2.5 3.0 3.2 3.5 3.5 3.9
            
Eastern Africa  1.7 1.8 1.9 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.8
E t h i o p i a  1 11111   11
Kenya 2 2 2.5 4.5 4.5 4.5  4.5 4.5
Malawi 0.5 0.5 0.5 2.5 2.5 2.5  2.5 2.5
Mauritius 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 5 5  5 5
Rwanda 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5  1.5 2.5
Uganda 2 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5  2.5 2.5
Zambia 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5  1.5 1.5
            
Northern Africa  1.4 1.4 1.6 1.6 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.3
E g y p t  1 11111   12
L i b y a n  A r a b  J a m a h i r i y a   1 11111   11
Sudan 1 12222  22
Tunisia 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 4 4  4 4
            
Southern Africa  3.0 3.0 3.7 5.0 5.3 5.7 6.0 7.2
Lesotho 1 1 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.5  2.5 4.5
Namibia 4 4 4.5 4.5 5.5 5.5  6.5 8
S o u t h  A f r i c a   4 45999   99
            
Western Africa  2.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 3.5 3.5 3.5
G h a n a  3 33335   55
N i g e r i a  3 . 5 3 . 5 3 . 5444   44
Sierra Leone  1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5  1.5 1.5
              38
 
(con’t.) Table 1. Transparency, by Region         
            
   1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 2005
Americas            
            
Latin America and Caribbean  2.7 2.8 2.9 3.4 3.7 3.8 4.0 4.0
East Caribbean  2.5 2.5 3 5.5 5.5 5.5  5.5 5.5
Aruba 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5  0.5 0.5
Bahamas 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5  4.5 4.5
B a r b a d o s  2 . 5 33333   33
Cuba 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5  2.5 2.5
Jamaica 3 3 3 4.5 6.5 6.5  6.5 6.5
Trinidad and Tobago  3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 4  5.5 5.5
            
Central America  2.4 2.4 2.4 3.0 3.0 3.1 4.1 4.1
Belize 2 2 2 3.5 3.5 3.5  3.5 3.5
El Salvador  2 22333  33
Guatemala 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5  4.5 4.5
M e x i c o  4 4444 4 . 5   5 . 5 5 . 5
            
South America  3.9 4.3 4.9 5.1 5.7 6.1 6.1 6.1
Argentina 3 3333 5 . 5  5 . 5 5 . 5
B r a z i l  3 . 5 5 . 59999   99
Chile 7 7 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5  7.5 7.5
C o l o m b i a  2 . 5 3 . 5 3 . 5 3 . 566   66
Guyana 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5  1.5 1.5
P e r u  4 . 5 4 . 5 4 . 5688   88
Uruguay 5 55555  55
 9 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5  9.5 9.5
North America   6.3 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7
B e r m u d a  1 11111   11
Canada 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5  10.5 10.5
United States of America  7.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5  8.5 8.5




(con’t.) Table 1. Transparency, by Region         
           
   1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 2005
Oceania 
 5.4 6.4 6.4 6.8 7.3 7.3 7.4 7.4
Australia and New Zealand  9.3 10.5 10.5 10.5 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.3 
A u s t r a l i a  8 8889999
New Zealand  10.5 13 13 13 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5
 
Melanesia  1.5 2.3 2.3 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.5
Fiji 1.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
Papua New Guinea  1 1 1 3.5 4 4 5 5
Solomon Islands  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Vanuatu 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
 
Asia  3.0 3.2 3.5 3.8 4.3 4.6 4.9 5.1
 
Central Asia  2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 2.7 3.3 4.0
Kazakhstan 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 5.5
K y r g y z s t a n  3 3344355
Tajikistan 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
 
Eastern Asia  4.6 4.8 5.2 5.2 5.7 6.3 6.6 6.6
China 1 1 1 1 1.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
Hong Kong   5 6 6 6 7 7 7 7
Korea 6.5 6.5 8 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5
Japan 8 8 8.5 8 8 8 9.5 9.5
Mongolia 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
 
Southern Asia  2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 3.0 3.5 3.9 3.9
Bangladesh 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 3 3.5 3.5
Bhutan 2 2 2 2 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
I n d i a  2 2222222
Pakistan 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.5
Sri Lanka  5 5 5 5 6.5 6.5 7 7  40
(con’t.) Table 1. Transparency, by Region 
   1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 
South-East Asia  3.0 3.9 4.9 5.5 6.4 7.1 7.3 7.5
Indonesia 3 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 7 8 8
M a l a y s i a  4 4555555
Philippines 3.5 5 5 6 10 10 10 10
Singapore 2.5 4 4 5.5 4.5 5.5 5.5 6.5
Thailand 2 2 6 6.5 8 8 8 8
 
Western Asia  2.3 2.4 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.4
A r m e n i a  4 4444444
Bahrain 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Cyprus 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 6 6 6.5 6.5
Georgia 3 3 3 3 3 3.5 3.5 3.5
I r a q  2 22222 2 . 5 2 . 5
Israel 5.5 7 7.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5
Jordan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.5 2
K u w a i t  1 1111111
Oman 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Q a t a r  3 3333333
Saudi Arabia  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Turkey 3 2 4 5.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5
United Arab Emirates  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Y e m e n  1 1111111
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(con’t.) Table 1. Transparency, by Region        
            
   1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 2005
            
Europe  5.2 5.5 5.8 6.2 6.7 7.1 7.4 7.5
            
Eastern Europe  3.4 3.9 4.3 4.5 5.4 5.5 6.0 6.4
B e l a r u s  1 . 5 3 . 55555   55
Bulgaria 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5  6 6.5
Czech Republic  9 10 10 10 10.5 11.5  11.5 11.5
Hungary 3 3 4.5 5.5 8 8  8 9.5
Poland 3 5 5 6.5 6.5 6.5  7 8
R e p u b l i c  o f  M o l d o v a   4 44555   55
Romania 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 4.5 4.5  6.5 6.5
Russian Federation  1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5  2.5 2.5
Slovakia 4 4 4.5 3.5 5.5 5.5  5.5 6
U k r a i n e  2 22233   33
            
Northern Europe  6.4 6.6 6.9 7.2 7.6 7.8 7.8 7.9
D e n m a r k  5 55556   66
Estonia 5 5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5  5 6
Iceland 5.5 5.5 7 7 7.5 7.5  7.5 7.5
L a t v i a  6 66666   66
Lithuania 4 4 4 4.5 4.5 4.5  4.5 4.5
Norway 6 6 6 7.5 7.5 7.5  8 8
Sweden 9 9 10 10 13 13  13 13
United Kingdom   11 12 12 12 12 12  12 12
            
Southern Europe  3.8 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.8 5.5 5.8 5.8
Albania 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 5  6 6
Croatia 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.5  2.5 2.5
Malta 5 5 5.5 5.5 5.5 7  7 7
Slovenia 5 5 5 5 7.5 7.5  7.5 7.5
            
Western Europe  7.3 7.8 8.0 9.0 9.0 9.5 10.0 10.0 
S w i t z e r l a n d  6 7 7 . 5889   9 . 5 9 . 5
European Union  8.5 8.5 8.5 10 10 10  10.5 10.5  42
Table 2. Components of  the Index for the 14 countries with extreme values       
   TI 1a 1b 1c 2a 2b 2c 3a 3b 3c 4a 4b 4c 5a 5b 5c 
New  Zealand  13.5  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  0.5  1 1  0.5  0.5 
Sweden  13  0.5  1  0.5  1 1 1 1 1 1 1  0.5  1 1 1  0.5 
UK  12  1 1 1  0.5  1 1 1 1 1 1  0.5  0 1  0.5  0.5 
Czech  Republic  11.5  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  0.5  1  0.5  0 0  0.5  1 
Canada  10.5  1 1 1 1 1  0.5  1 0 0 1 1 0 1  0.5  0.5 
Euro  area  10.5  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1  0.5  0 1  0.5  0.5 
Philippines  10  1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1  0.5  1  0.5  0 0  0.5  0.5 
Bermuda  1  0.5  0  0.5  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ethiopia  1  0.5  0  0.5  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  Kuwait  1  0.5  0  0.5  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Libya  1  0.5  0  0.5  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Yemen  1  0.5  0  0.5  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Aruba  0.5  0 0  0.5  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Saudi  Arabia  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 3. Regional Transparency Index (Weighted) 
   1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
          
Africa   2.58  2.56  2.90  4.27 4.46 5.05 5.32 5.38 
          
Eastern Africa  1.83  1.91  2.08 2.85 3.06 3.10 3.03 3.00 
Northern Africa  1.21  1.20  1.25 1.27 1.55 1.62 1.67 2.10 
Southern Africa  3.98  3.98  4.97 8.84 8.86 8.87 8.90 8.95 
Western Africa  3.37  3.38  3.42 3.86 3.84 4.08 4.08 4.07 
          
Americas 7.02  8.04  8.20  8.20 8.30 8.37 8.43 8.43 
          
Latin America and   
Caribbean  2.84 2.88 3.14 4.62 4.94 5.13 5.54 5.54 
Central America  3.84  3.86  3.88 3.90 3.89 4.36 5.41 5.41 
South America  3.59  4.71  6.67 6.60 7.63 7.94 7.94 7.98 
North America   7.70  8.63  8.64 8.63 8.63 8.65 8.65 8.66 
          
Oceania 8.22  8.54  8.51  8.56 9.51 9.54 9.55 9.56 
          
Australia and New 
Zealand 8.32  8.62  8.59  8.62 9.57 9.59 9.60 9.61 
Melanesia 1.21  2.19  2.10  3.69 4.02 4.04 4.61 4.62 
          
Asia  5.60 5.75 6.20 5.81 5.90 6.48 7.16 7.08 
          
Central Asia  3.36  3.35  3.37 3.44 3.44 3.38 3.48 5.33 
Eastern Asia  6.51  6.60  7.04 6.47 6.48 7.16 8.05 7.89 
Southern Asia  1.98  1.98  1.99 2.02 2.06 2.23 2.38 2.38 
South-East Asia  2.89  3.80  4.91 5.40 6.05 7.06 7.39 7.54 
Western Asia  2.59  2.46  3.04 3.52 4.34 4.47 4.56 5.03 
          
Europe  8.27 8.57 8.58 9.60 9.70 9.74  10.10  10.02 
          
Eastern Europe  2.82  3.71  3.62 3.98 4.50 4.53 5.05 5.22 
Northern Europe  9.78  10.49  10.62 10.74 11.07 11.12 11.18 11.13 
Southern Europe  3.37  3.46  3.50 3.87 4.89 5.12 5.17 5.13 
Western Europe  8.40  8.44  8.46 9.92 9.92 9.96  10.46  10.46 
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Table 4. Determinants of Transparency, 1998-2004 Averages† 
 I  II  III  IV 
Constant  -8.69* -9.49* -7.29* -7.01* 
  (-3.31) (-3.85) (-3.12) (-2.46) 
Past  inflation  -1.17 -1.90 -0.50 0.02 
  (-0.53) (-0.88) (-0.24) (0.01) 
Exchange  Rate  Regime  0.29* 0.30* 0.24* 0.28* 
  (4.66) (4.77) (4.09) (4.52) 
Financial Depth  -0.00  -0.00  0.00  -0.01 
 (-0.63)  (-0.37)  (0.30)  (-0.85) 
GDP per Capita  1.10*  1.25*  0.86*  0.80 
  (3.07) (3.88) (2.81) (1.90) 
Rule of Law  0.03       
  (1.66)     
Political  Stability   0.02    
   (1.43)    
Voice and Accountability      0.04*   
     (3.41)  
Government  Efficiency      0.04* 
      (2.18) 
      
R-Squared  0.55 0.54 0.60 0.56 
* denotes significance at 5% 
†t-statistics in parentheses  45
Table 5. Further Determinants of Transparency, 1998-2004 Averages 
 I  II  III  IV 
Constant  -7.02* -8.04* -5.51*  -4.87 
 (2.46)  (2.83)  (-2.13)  (-1.60) 
Past inflation  -0.65  -1.27  0.35  0.83 
 (-0.27)  (-0.52)  (0.15)  (0.33) 
Openness    -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* 
  (-2.17) (-2.28) (-2.12) (-2.13) 
Openness*ER  Regime    0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 
  (3.18) (3.06) (2.30) (3.14) 
Financial Depth  -0.01  0.01  0.01  -0.01 
 (-0.38)  (0.01)  (0.57)  (-0.62) 
GDP per Capita  1.14*  1.35*  0.87*  0.73 
  (2.93) (3.74) (2.53) (1.62) 
Rule of Law  0.03       
  (1.70)     
Political  Stability   0.02    
   (1.13)    
Voice and Accountability      0.04*   
     (3.28)  
Government  Efficiency      0.05* 
      (2.46) 
      
R-Squared  0.49 0.48 0.55 0.52 
* denotes significance at 5% 
†t-statistics in parentheses   46
Table 6. Determinants of Transparency, Fixed Effects Models  
 I  II  III  IV 
Constant  -34.52 -40.65 -41.50 -40.87 
  (-0.09) (-0.11) (-0.11) (-0.11) 
Past inflation  -0.03  0.10  0.10  -0.04 
 (-0.09)  (0.25)  (0.27)  (-0.11) 
ER  Regime  Dummy  0.09* 0.12* 0.12* 0.11* 
  (2.52) (3.41) (3.39) (3.19) 
Financial  Depth  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (-0.16) (-0.10) (-0.13) (-0.19) 
GDP  per  Capita  4.61* 5.05* 5.11* 5.15* 
  (9.35)  (10.41) (10.70) (10.79) 
Rule of Law  -0.04*       
  (-3.22)     
Political Stability    -0.00     
   (-0.47)     
Voice and Accountability      0.00   
     (0.33)  
Government  Efficiency      -0.01 
      (-1.27) 
      
Haussman  test  15.96* 22.61* 25.58* 23.70* 
       
R-Squared  0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
* denotes significance at 5% 
†t-statistics in parentheses   47
Table 7. Determinants of Transparency, Fixed Effects Models  
 I  II  III  IV 
Constant  -31.95 -38.33 -39.40 -38.37 
  (-0.08) (-0.10) (-0.10) (-0.10) 
Past inflation  -0.09  0.07  0.09  -0.12 
 (-0.24)  (0.19)  (0.22)  (-0.29) 
Openness  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  (-0.70) (-0.43) (-0.40) (-0.37) 
Openness*ER  Dummy  0.01  0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 
  (1.97) (2.33) (2.26) (2.29) 
Financial  Depth  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  (-0.55) (-0.54) (-0.61) (-0.69) 
GDP  per  Capita  4.46* 4.89* 4.94* 4.99* 
  (8.71) (9.54) (9.76) (9.87) 
Rule of Law  -0.04*       
  (-3.68)     
Political Stability    -0.00     
   (-0.31)     
Voice and Accountability      0.01   
     (0.83)  
Government  Efficiency      -0.02* 
      (-1.72) 
      
Haussman  test  13.36* 19.10* 21.92* 19.47* 
      
R-Squared  0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
* denotes significance at 5% 
†t-statistics in parentheses   48
 
 
Table 8. Effect of Transparency on Inflation Variability (instrumental variables  
pooled regressions) 
 I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
Constant 7.59
*  7.41*  7.43* 1.45 6.94* 1.66 
  (7.44) (7.93) (7.21) (1.36) (7.73) (1.64) 
Transparency  Index  -1.23* -1.27* -1.00*  -0.30  -1.04* -0.49* 
  (-5.79) (-5.54) (-4.69) (-1.66) (-4.67) (-2.69) 
Openness   0.01     0.01*  0.00 
   (1.51)    (2.24)  (0.21) 
Financial  Depth     -0.01*  -0.02*  0.01* 
     (-2.60)  (-3.18)  (2.12) 
Past  Inflation      29.36*    29.67* 
      (6.17)    (6.18) 
Number of observations    579  546  562  578  524  531 
         
Sum  of  Sq.  Res.  19561  19452  19452 8216 19242 8131 
* denotes significance at 5% 
†t-statistics in parantheses  
Note: Dependent variable is inflation variability, which is the standard deviation of the inflation rate for 12 months. 
Transparency is the fitted value of transparency from the first  
stage regression on constant and rule of law. 
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Table 9. Effect of Transparency on Inflation Persistence (instrumental variables pooled regressions) 
 I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
Constant 0.79
*  0.82* 0.79* 0.77* 0.80* 0.79* 
  (18.90) (18.80) (18.27) (14.91) (17.72) (15.74) 
Transparency  Index  -0.02*  -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
  (-2.05) (-1.90) (-0.45) (-1.57) (-0.91) (-0.81) 
Openness   -0.01      0.01  0.01 
   (-0.79)      (0.28)  (0.18) 
Financial Depth      -0.01*    -0.01  -0.01 
     (-2.26)      (-1.93)  (-1.73) 
Past  Inflation       0.10  0.06 
     
 
(0.65)  (0.40) 
Number of observations    568  538  552  567  524  523 
         
Sum of Sq. Res.     49  44  46  49  42  42 
* denotes significance at 5% 
†t-statistics in parentheses. 
Note: Dependent variable is inflation persistence, which is the estimated coefficient of the regression where monthly inflation data is used  
and inflation is regressed on the inflation in the previous month. 
Transparency is the fitted value of transparency from the first  
stage regression on a constant and rule of law. 
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Table 10. Alternative Specification for Inflation Persistence  
instrumental variables pooled regressions 
 I  II  III 
Constant 0.01
*  0.02* 0.02* 
  (3.77) (3.19) (3.71) 
Lag_inf  1.00* 1.00* 0.92* 
  (4.28) (4.26) (4.05) 
Lag_inf*  transparency  -0.16 -0.16 -0.15 
  (-1.92) (-1.93) (-1.85) 
Openness   -0.00  0.00* 
   (-0.45)  (2.45) 
Financial Depth      -0.00* 
     (-4.96) 
DW  test  1.42 1.42 1.40 
R-Squared     0.48  0.47    0.49 
* denotes significance at 5% 
†t-statistics in parentheses 
Transparency is instrumented as described in the text. 
Note: (1) Dependent variable is inflation 
(2) Transparency is the fitted value of transparency from the first  
stage regression on a constant and rule of law. 
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Table 11. Effects of Transparency on Output Variability  
(instrumental variables pooled regressions) 
 I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
Constant  3.81* 3.63* 3.76* 3.38* 3.52* 3.18* 
  (10.81) (9.00) (10.48) (9.00)  (8.38)  (7.35) 
Transparency  Index -0.33* -0.41* -0.38* -0.27* -0.39* -0.36* 
  (-4.51) (-5.66) (-4.46) (-3.50) (-4.49) (-4.06) 
Openness   0.01     0.01*  0.00* 
   (2.98)    (2.52)  (2.21) 
Financial  Depth     0.01*   0.01  0.01 
     (1.87)  (0.51)  (1.11) 
Past  Inflation       2.24*  2.36* 
       (3.48)  (3.29) 
        
Number  of  obs.  648 606 626 618 586 566 
        
Sum  of  Sq.  Res.  3181 2987 3064 2946 2906 2748 
* denotes significance at 5% 
†t-statistics in parentheses 
Note: (1) Dependent variable is output variability 
(2) Output variability is computed as the standard deviation of the annual GDP growth rate over the period t-2 to t (where t denotes the 
current year) 
         (3) Transparency is the fitted value of transparency from the first stage regression on a constant and rule of law. 
 